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Mental Illness: Genetically Review
Complex Disorders of Neural Circuitry Introduction
and Neural Communication
activity disorder, panic disorder, posttraumatic stress
disorder, and eating disorders. A strength of each of the
review papers is their attempt to delineate what is known
of the neural circuitry that might be involved in patho-
genesis. Each of these disorders, however, produces
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abnormalities of the highest integrative aspects of hu-
man functioning: cognition, emotional regulation, andThis issue of Neuron reviews progress in the neurobiol-
behavioral control. For each of these neural functions,ogy of several disorders that are often lumped by the
relevant brain circuitry has been far more difficult topublic and medical professionals alike as “mental ill-
map than that for sensory inputs to the brain or motornesses.” This archaic terminology fails to capture the
outputs. Thus, for example, our understanding of cir-
fact that these are disorders of the brain and has, thus,
cuitry that regulates mood (where mood is defined as
contributed to misunderstandings and, often, to stigma-
the predominant emotional state of an organism over
tization of sufferers. Brain disorders affecting cognition,
time) remains fragmentary (Fava and Kendler, 2000 [this
emotion, and behavior have enormous public health sig-
issue of Neuron]). Moreover, the “lesions” in relevant
nificance. Based on their prevalence alone (Table 1),
circuits that might cause mental illness are not so obvi-
mental disorders would represent an important problem, ous as the death of dopamine neurons in Parkinson’s
although the prevalence of an illness does not, by itself, disease or the plaques and tangles of Alzheimer’s dis-
capture its burden on society. After all, the common ease. There is early evidence for subtle cellular and
cold is prevalent but causes little disability or economic regional neuroanatomical abnormalities in schizophre-
damage. Mortality has been a traditional measure of nia (Selemon and Goldman-Rakic, 1999; Lewis and Lieb-
disease burden, and indeed suicide is a particularly erman, 2000 [this issue of Neuron]) and early, uncon-
tragic, and not uncommon, result of mental illness (sui- firmed observations of neuropathological abnormalities
cide is the eighth leading cause of death in the United in autism (Lord et al., 2000 [this issue of Neuron]). How-
States overall and the third leading cause of death ever, no compelling evidence exists for gross anatomic
among people aged 15–24). However, mortality data pathology in mood disorders or obsessive-compulsive
underestimate the impact of mental disorders on soci- disorder. Indeed, mental illnesses may best be charac-
ety. In attempts to quantify the relationship between terized as disorders of neural communication leading
disease and its economic and social impact, the World to abnormal cognition, emotion, and behavior. In schizo-
Health Organization, World Bank, and Harvard School of phrenia and autism, abnormalities in the maturation of
Public Health developed a measure called the Disability neural circuits may produce detectable anatomic pa-
Adjusted Life Year (DALY) equivalent to healthy years thology that results in inappropriate or maladaptive in-
of life lost to premature mortality or disability (Murray formation processing. In mood and anxiety disorders,
and Lopez, 1996). Because neuropsychiatric disorders it is possible that morphological abnormalities may not
cause serious impairments, generally have their onset be found; rather, subtle variations in the responsiveness
early in life, and often run a chronic or recurrent course, of neural circuits due to variations in the structure, loca-
they are a substantial cause of disability. Thus, eight of tion, or expression levels of critical proteins may be
the ten leading causes of disability in the United States responsible for pathogenesis. In addiction, one view is
are neuropsychiatric disorders with four representing that the illness can be understood as a disorder of syn-
narrowly defined “mental disorders” (Table 2). When aptic plasticity. In addiction, normal associative learning
DALYs (premature mortality plus disability) are em- mechanisms that are under the control of dopamine are
ployed, narrowly defined mental disorders as a group recruited by drugs of abuse (all of which cause dopa-
rank second only to cardiovascular disease as a cause mine release) to produce synaptic remodeling that could
of disease burden in the United States. Cardiovascular alter circuit behavior and ultimately produce the compul-
disease does not appear in Table 2 because its quantita- sive drug use of the addicted individual (Berke and
tive impact on DALYs reflects mortality far more than Hyman, 2000). Posttraumatic stress disorder in which
years lost to disability (YLD). specific experiences lead to the production of disabling
symptoms and even major depression may also be initi-The barriers to understanding mental illnesses extend
ated by processes normally involved in synaptic plasticity,far beyond popular misconceptions. Indeed, as the re-
perhaps in circuits involved in both explicit and in “emo-views in this issue of Neuron make clear, extremely
tional memory” (Fanselow and LeDoux, 1999). Clearly, thechallenging scientific problems remain if we are to un-
discovery of risk genes for each of these disorders willderstand the pathogenesis of schizophrenia, autism,
provide critically important tools for understanding themajor depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, or
timing and nature of pathogenesis.Tourette’s syndrome. No less challenging are the out-
All of the mental disorders discussed in this issue ofstanding problems to understand other common serious
Neuron exhibit a significant genetic component of riskdisorders not covered in this issue, including bipolar
as illustrated by the observation that recurrence riskdisorder (manic depressive illness), attention deficit hyper-
ratios (8) increase with degree of relatedness. In some
disorders, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,
studies of probands adopted away from their biological* E-mail: shyman@helix.nih.gov
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Table 1. The 1 Year Prevalence of Mental Disorders in Community Samples in the United States
Disorder 12 Month Prevalence
Schizophrenia 1.3%
Major depression (clinically significant) 5.3%




Posttraumatic stress disorder 3.6%
Anorexia nervosa 0.1%
Bulimia 1.1%–4.2% of femalesa
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1999). Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General. (Rockville, MD: U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse, and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Mental Health Services, National
Institutes of Health, National Institute of Mental Health).
a Source: American Psychiatric Association Work Group on Eating Disorders (2000). Practice guideline for the treatment of patients with eating
disorders (revision). Am. J. Psychiatry 157 (Suppl), 1–39.
families early in life have generally corroborated the role conjunction with nongenetic factors. The relevant non-
genetic factors may include both stochastic develop-of genes. However, studies of the mode of segregation
of mental disorders within extended pedigrees and stud- mental factors and specific environmental factors. Envi-
ronmental factors could range from relatively physicalies comparing risk of mental disorders in monozygotic
versus dizygotic twins or nontwin siblings have led to aspects of the environment, such as streptococcal in-
fections as suggested for some forms of Tourette’s syn-the conclusion that risk of the common forms of mental
disorders is genetically complex. Inspecting Table 3, it drome, ADHD, or obsessive-compulsive disorder (Leck-
man and Riddle, 2000 [this issue of Neuron]; Graybielcan be observed that expected Mendelian ratios be-
tween monozygotic twins and nontwin siblings do not and Rauch, 2000 [this issue of Neuron]), to more experi-
ential aspects of the environment, such as stressful lifeobtain for these disorders, leading to models of oligo-
genic or polygenic transmission of risk. In addition, there events in major depression (Fava and Kendler, 2000).
In practice, genetic complexity has made it very diffi-is no mental disorder with 100% concordance between
monozygotic twins. Thus, the multiple risk genes must cult to identify risk genes for mental disorders (Maestrini
et al., 2000). Compared with widespread success in theinteract with nongenetic factors to produce illness.
For some genetically complex disorders such as Alz- identification and cloning of genes responsible for Men-
delian disorders of the nervous system such as Hunting-heimer’s disease, rare Mendelian forms have been found
that have permitted the discovery of causative genes ton’s disease, replicable genetic linkages for mental
disorders have not yet materialized. Will we be able toand insight into pathogenesis that extend to common
forms. If rare Mendelian forms of schizophrenia, bipolar find multiple alleles each contributing a small incre-
ment of risk, no doubt in epistatic interaction with eachdisorder, depression, or other mental disorders exist,
they have not yet been identified. Two single-gene disor- other? Here the rapid expansion of genomic and genetic
tools are reason for optimism. Ultimately, we will haveders, Rett syndrome (Amir et al., 1999) and Fragile X
syndrome, share features with autism, although they are not only the reference human sequence for which rough
drafts are now available but also increasingly completenot identical (Lord et al., this issue)—they nonetheless
may provide important insights into the biology of the catalogs of human genetic variation, such as single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) complemented bymore common, complex forms of autism. Overall, how-
ever, the pathogenesis of mental disorders appears to cheaper methods of high-throughput genotyping. Ulti-
mately, given the fact that common human genetic varia-depend on multiple genes interacting to confer risk in
tions are a bounded set, it should be possible to perform
whole-genome association studies and succeed by brute
Table 2. Rank Order of Causes of Disability in the United States
and Other Developed Countries
Table 3. Recurrence Risk Ratios for Selected Mental andRank Cause of Disability Percent of Total YLDs
General Medical Disorders
1 Unipolar major depression 14.3
Risk Ratio l2 Alcohol use 9.6
3 Osteoarthritis 5.8 Disorders Siblings Identical Twins
4 Dementia & degen. CNS 5.1
5 Schizophrenia 4.7 Autism 50–150 2000
Tourette’s 200 1000 (?)6 Bipolar disorder 3.6
7 Cerebrovascular 3.3 Bipolar disorders 7 60
Schizophrenia 9 488 Diabetes 3.2
9 OCD 3.1 Type II diabetes 2–3 16
Depression 2–5 810 Drug use 3.0
These ratios show increasing recurrence risk with increasing geneticData shown are for individuals above the age of 5, expressed as a
percent of total years lost to disability (YLD). Disorders of the brain similarity. The question mark of Tourette’s reflects the dearth of
twin studies. See Genetics Workgroup, NIMH (1999).are in italic.
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Lord, C., Cook, E.H., Leventhal, B.L., and Amaral, D.G. (2000). Autismforce should other approaches at gene hunting fail
spectrum disorders. Neuron 28, this issue, 355–363.(Risch and Merikangas, 1996; Kruglyak, 1999).
Kendler, K.S., Neale, M.C., Kessler, R.C., Heath, A.C., and Eaves, L.J.Exacerbating the problem of genetic complexity for
(1992). Major depression and generalized anxiety disorder. Samegene hunters is the problem of phenotyping in mental
genes, (partly) different environments? Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 49,
disorders. There are currently no objective biological 716–722.
markers of adequate sensitivity and specificity to make Kruglyak, L. (1999). Prospects for whole-genome linkage disequilib-
diagnoses. Thus, the classification of mental disorders rium mapping of common disease genes. Nat. Genet. 22, 139–144.
relies on sets of behavioral criteria. While these have Maestrini, E., Paul, A., Monaco, A.P., and Bailey, A. (2000). Identifying
permitted substantial agreement between raters (reli- autism susceptibility genes. Neuron 28, 19–24.
ability), serious questions remain about the validity of the Mirnics, K., Middleton, F.A., Marquez, A., Lewis, D.A., and Levitt,
syndromes described by the criteria sets. The diagnostic P. (2000). Molecular characterization of schizophrenia viewed by
microarray analysis of gene expression in prefrontal cortex. Neuronsystem in widest use in the U.S. is the Diagnostic and
28, 53–67.Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition
Murray, C.J.L., and Lopez, A.D. (1996). The Global Burden of Disease(DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Association (1994).
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).The approach taken by this classification is based on
Genetics Workgroup, NIMH (1999). Report of the National Institute ofearlier attempts (Robins and Guze, 1970) to identify
Mental Health’s Genetics Workgroup. Biol. Psychiatry 45, 559–602.symptoms that cluster together, that run in families, and
Risch, N.J., and Merikangas, K. (1996). The future of genetic studiesthat have prognostic significance over a lifetime. The
of complex human diseases. Science 273, 1516–1517.
additional need for biological markers has long been
Robins, E., and Guze, S.B. (1970). Establishment of diagnostic valid-
recognized and long been missed. Unfortunately the ity in psychiatric illness. Its application to schizophrenia. Am. J.
genetic complexity of these disorders has meant that Psychiatry 126, 983–988.
the symptom clusters of the DSM-IV do not always breed Selemon, L.D., and Goldman-Rakic, P.S. (1999). The reduced neu-
true and that shared genetic risk may lead to very differ- ropil hypothesis: a circuit based model of schizophrenia. Biol. Psy-
chiatry 45, 17–25.ent phenotypes (Kendler et al., 1992). Although it sounds
circular, it may be that phenotypes may only be clarified
as we begin to obtain some genotypes.
Perhaps we should not be surprised that disorders
that affect the most complex aspects of our functioning
as human beings, should turn out to be so complex
genetically and pathophysiologically. However, the ge-
nome project and its follow-ons are bearing fruit; neuro-
imaging and physiologic approaches that will help us
better analyze neural connectivity and neural circuit
function are maturing; other technologies are emerging,
including the application of genomic and proteomic mi-
croarrays to postmortem brain tissue (Mirnics et al.,
2000). We will undoubtedly see continued, indeed accel-
erating, progress in understanding pathogenesis of
mental disorders. Ultimately, of course, this progress in
neurobiology will lead to more certain diagnoses and
better treatments.
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